By Steve Paterno
May 13, 2012 — Diplomatically, when the Paanthou crisis occurred, South Sudan found itself unprepared and underrepresented in the diplomatic front. The diplomatic ferocity of its opponent in Khartoum to spread propaganda was never been equally matched. Just overnight, the newly emerged country found itself almost isolated internationally, for acting rightly in self defense. The barrage of condemnations against South Sudan came from even close allies and friends such as the USA.
As a result, South Sudan had to resort into drastic measures. The nation made a painful decision just to please the international community by immediately ordering the pulling out of its troops from Paanthou, an area that belongs to South Sudan but claimed by Khartoum, because of its oil wealth. To further compromise and heed to the international community call, South Sudan even went out of its way by doing more than its share of responsibility, when it decided to withdraw its police forces from Abyei area, leaving the civilians basically vulnerable under the mercy of cruel Khartoum armed forces.
To make up for its diplomatic gap, South Sudan dispatched high level official delegation into foreign capitals to plea for South Sudan case. This then followed by deployments of South Sudanese ambassadors to strategic countries and international organizations. South Sudan is now in a bit better shape to make its case heard internationally, which is really simple in a way. Actually, there is no moral equivalent between Juba and Khartoum so as to level the competition. Khartoum is ruled like how the criminals run the streets of crime hit cities in the West. The government in Khartoum is run by what the Sudanese people locally refer to as mujirimin (thugs). Even the head of the Khartoum regime, President Omar al-Bashir is an indicted criminal and an international fugitive. The regime is killing its people and causing problems with everyone else. The records are there in abandon to speak for themselves.
Now that South Sudan has done more than its share of obligations, it is the turn of international community to pressure the mujirimin in Khartoum to act in accordance with international norms and demands. Khartoum must be held to account for all the UN resolutions and other agreements it unilaterally abrogate and continue to violate. This then will pave the way for peaceful negotiations as it will place Juba and Khartoum under equal footing, because as things currently stand, the two are not equal in the world standing.
In order for a peaceful and genuine negotiations to take place, the negotiations between South and North Sudan must be transferred under the auspicious of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). One begins to wonder how in the first place the negotiations between South and North Sudan ended up under the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), headed by a failed South African politician Thabo Mbeki, a former South African president who could not even secure the chairmanship position in his political party of African National Congress (ANC), even though he was an anointed president of the Republic of South Africa. The panel is not only headed by a failed politician, but it has proven in its deed that it is failing, since it has done it in Darfur and is now doing it in the case of South Sudan. Sadly enough, this supposedly continental panel includes consultants like Dr. Alex De Waal, an opportunist masquerading as scholar and expert on Sudan. The following two articles (Alex De Waal and Darfur Genocide Question and Alex De Waal response by proxy on Darfur genocide question), written by this author is enough to portray an accurate picture and motives of Dr. Alex De Waal in his involvement in Sudanese affairs. In short, (AUHIP) appears more of a dumping ground for employment accommodations awarded to African failed politicians such as Thabo Mbeki or the Western opportunists, masquerading as experts, the likes of Dr. Alex De Waal. No wonder right after the Paanthou crisis, Mbeki ran to the UN and began to toe the line of Khartoum, by accusing South Sudan for aggression. How can South Sudan a victim of constant belligerence suddenly turned into an aggressor in a course of one night is still baffling to those who follow issues in that region.
At any rate, the stakes involved is more higher than accommodations of failed politicians and making the relevance of expertise of Western opportunists. For that reason, the IGAD must immediately take over the negotiations since the issues under negotiations are pertinent to Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA), brokered by IGAD.
Otherwise, the easiest unilateral alternative for South Sudan is clear as it is declared in South Sudan TV by a South Sudanese army general deputy chief of staff Isaac Obuto Mamur that in case of a failed political settlement, the South Sudanese army stands ready; starting by demarcating the borders in African style of courage, honor, and sacrifice. The declaration by the battle hardened General with the body that sustains more bullet wounds than an African elephant can withstand is of course not just a bravado pep talk to the troops. The South Sudanese troops have just proven to their opponents in Khartoum and the entire world that they can easily demarcate the borders if they so wish to. So, that decision is currently pending under political negotiations, while the South Sudanese troops reserve its rights to demarcate the borders. The UN Security Council threats of sanctions against the Republic of South Sudan has actually little bearing on abilities, moral, and battle prowess of South Sudanese troops—the generation of people who are driven by their desires for freedom, justice, and equality.
Militarily
South Sudanese gallant forces, the SPLA has performed outstandingly as they acted in self defense to chase Khartoum forces from Paanthou. They sent Khartoum weak armed forces running, leaving behind scores of dead bodies, all their belongings, and even some human souls that the SPLA is able to preserve as prisoners of war (POW), in accordance with Geneva Protocal of war. Simply put: SPLA incursion into Paanthou has proven that Khartoum armed forces is not a competition in ground combat in comparison to SPLA. Khartoum is still winning the air war though, where South Sudan is lacking behind. This means, South Sudan needs to upgrade its air defense capabilities so as to effectively deal Khartoum a blow.
More importantly, South Sudan needs to manage and coordinate its military operations against Khartoum jointly with Khartoum’s armed oppositions, particularly the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The opportunity of coordination has been missed during the incursion of Paanthou, because the action was in response of self defense and unplanned. However, with a better planning and strategy in coordination with the other armed groups in the Republic of Sudan, an incident similar to Paanthou scope, would have created a momentum that will establish a life of its own in driving the Omar al-Bashir thuggish regime out of power within just a shortest period of time.
Since, the coalition against Khartoum regime extends far and beyond, South Sudan must capitalize on the momentum in making sure the coalition stick and increase in size. Uganda already bravely came out against Khartoum’s regime belligerence by declaring its readiness to face Khartoum in its aggression, which it wages not just against South Sudan but neighboring nations, such as supporting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda.
Ironically, and by implications, the USA military is also involved in this coalition war against Khartoum, despite the contradictions of American administration public condemnation of South Sudan. In a letter from US President Barack Obama to American Congress, dated October 14, 2011, the America President revealed that he decided to deployed American troops in central Africa to combat the LRA atrocities. The troops are specifically deployed in areas affected by LRA, Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In a layman’s word, America decided to fight the LRA, which actually means, fighting Khartoum—the force behind LRA. Perhaps it is a high time that the South Sudan President Salva Kiir pay a courtesy call across to American President Barack Obama so as to have him explain the contradiction of trying to fight the LRA, which is supported by Khartoum against South Sudan, and at the same time condemning South Sudan for standing up against Khartoum’s constant belligerence. So, if President Obama gives a lame excuse for the contradiction of policy because of American election, then he must have a courage to explain to any of the families of those American combat forces fighting the LRA who are the real backer behind the LRA, specially the provider of the weapons and bullets that will kill these brave American soldiers during this combat operation.
Politically
The CPA was intended to transform the Sudan. Since the CPA was signed, all the political forces, which are by the way oppose to the regime in Khartoum with a vehement zeal, were looking for direction so as to challenge the brutal dictatorship of National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum. Since then, they never found a direction. Now there is an opportunity for them to effectively deal with the thuggish regime in Khartoum by looking for direction and leadership in the Republic of South Sudan. Therefore, the Republic of South Sudan needs to call and sponsor a conference of all Sudanese opposition groups to be held in Juba. The conference goal should be the overthrow of the criminal President Omar al-Bashir and his NCP regime, among other things.
In case the South Sudan government, the SPLM in particular has not done it yet, they need to immediately establish contact and send special invitation to come to Juba for the popular governor of Gadaref state, Karamallah Abbas, who is bravely challenging the regime in Khartoum. Governor Abbas is the first to challenge the marginalization of the people of Gadaref by the regime in Khartoum, which led into his ouster from power by the regime. Gadarif state is a rich agricultural area, but yet the local people of the state go hungry despite the food they produce. The awareness of marginalization orchestrated from Khartoum is now spreading like cancer and South Sudan must lead in creating the awareness.
Steve Paterno is the author of The Rev. Fr. Saturnino Lohure, A Romain Catholic Priest Turned Rebel. He can be reached at stevepaterno@yahoo.com
By Luka Biong Deng
May 11, 2012 — When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, the Sudanese and the international community were relieved as Sudan would be put on the path of peace and stability. The world was further reassured by the way the referendum for the people of South Sudan was conducted and the acceptance of President of Sudan of the choice of the people of South Sudan to have their own independent state. Consequently, all members of the United Nations unanimously accepted the membership of the newest state with optimism that the two states would work together to resolve the post-secession pending issues.
However such optimism was dashed and to the surprise of international community the two states resorted to the logic of war instead of dialogue to resolve their pending issues. With the closure of oil production in the South, escalation of war along their borders, declaration of state of emergency by Sudan in all states bordering the South to restrict flow of goods to the South and the danger of state of stateless faced by Southerners who are still in Sudan, the two states are virtually in war. The real question is why the two states resort to the logic of war rather than dialogue and will they be able to afford it?
This unexpected and hostile behavior of the two states underlined serious economic fragility faced by the two states as both suffer from the “resource curse” and poor governance, particularly Sudan. The two states depend entirely on the oil revenue and their difference over the management of oil after the secession of the South triggers this antagonistic behavior. It would have been simple arrangements after secession that the South to manage its own oil and pay internationally accepted fees for the use of oil infrastructure in the Sudan. However after the secession of the South, Sudan puts very a high bill to be covered by the South not only for the use of its pipelines (USD36 per barrel) but also to meet the budget deficit (USD10 billion) caused by the secession of the South.
Access to the oil revenue of the South is a matter of economic and political survival of the regime in Sudan. After the discovery of oil, the economy of Sudan moved away from agriculture to oil resource economy and it becomes a victim of the resource curse with oil revenue constituting more than 90 percent of aggregate foreign exchange earnings. Using some indices to assess the severity of the resource curse, Sudan has been among the ten least performing countries in the world on the basis of the index adopted by the World Bank called the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) that assesses aspects related to rule-based governance, quality of budgetary management and public administration. Also Sudan has been among the least five performing countries based on Corruption Perception Index (CPI) adopted by Transparency International. Also on the basis of the two indices adopted by the Freedom House to measure the level of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL), Sudan has been scoring the least scores in the region and the world. Besides these indices, the leadership of Sudan is crippled as its President, minister of defense and one of its state governor are indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) over genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur and with such abuses further committed in Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. With these appalling indices, defeat by the South of the military establishment in Sudan and coupled with the secession of the South that took with it more than 75% of the oil revenue, it becomes apparent that Sudan is heading to imminent political and economic collapse.
When Sudan became unreasonable on the use of its pipeline and eventually it becomes a pirate of the oil exports of the South transported through Sudan, the South was left with no any other option but to close its oil production. This decision stunned the international community and particularly the regime in Khartoum that underrated the ability of the South to take such bold decision because of its reliance on oil revenue that constituted 98% of the budget. While the decision reaffirms the sovereignty and dignity of the people of the South, it vividly exposes the economic and political fragility of the regime in Sudan. Instead of addressing the economic effects caused by the secession of the South, the regime in Khartoum pursued the option of war as the only means to mobilize the people of Sudan and to shift their attention away from the deteriorating living conditions. The fighting along the border with the South was part of this strategy to silence and pacify the voices that called for the regime change. In fact the fight of Sudan over Heglig is less about the territory but more about oil as there are many disputed areas along its border such as Halayib with Egypt. Given its current conditions, the regime in Sudan has no economic and political capability to sustain war with the South.
On the other hand the South faces the same symptoms of the “resource curse” but slightly better than Sudan, particularly in civil liberties and political rights. Given the high expectations from the people of South for better life after independence, the leadership of the South has less to gain from war. In fact one would say that the South was dragged in self-defense into the recent war along its border with the Sudan as the military establishment in Sudan imposed this option of war on the people of the South. The defeat of Sudan Armed Forces by the South in Heglig has profoundly exposed the weakness of military establishment in Khartoum. Despite its military success in defeating Sudan, the South does not have appetite or economic capability to wage and sustain war with the Sudan except in self-defense.
With the defeat of military establishment in Sudan, the unanimous stance of international community against eruption of war and the serious economic hardship caused by the closure of oil production, there will be now pragmatism from the two states. There is now a window of opportunity for finding amicable solution for the pending issues. The seven points roadmap adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) provides a framework within a time-bound of three months for resolving holistically all the pending issues between the two states. Also, the unanimous decision of the United Nations Security Council to fully support the AUPSC’s roadmap and to effect the implementation of this roadmap under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter would encourage the two states to reach agreement on these pending issues and to avoid sanctions.
While South Sudan welcomes the roadmap, it has raised concerns over the mediation and facilitation of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), particularly over the role of its chair President Mbaki after his report to UNSC. On the other hand the Sudan welcomes the AU roadmap but not comfortable with referring the issue to UNSC under Chapter VII and this shows the intention of Sudan to continue with its piecemeal and time-buying approach. In fact the two states are assessing the process that would increase their chances for getting a good deal. While the South is uncomfortable with the role of AUHIP, it may not be diplomatically appropriate for the leaders of the South to discuss such issue in the media. The South as a member of AU has the right to officially and in silent diplomacy raise its concerns over the mediation role of AUHIP. The fact of the matter is that UNSC has not only endorsed the mediation role of AUHIP, but it has asked the UN Secretary General in consultation with AUHIP, in case of failure of the negotiations, to prepare report including detailed proposals regarding the pending issues.
It is important for the South to recognize that President Mbaki enjoys overwhelming support from African leaders and international community. Also he has unique and rich wealth of experience and strategic thinking and he stands as one of the few African intellectuals with righteous and strategic ideas for the future of Africa. As a freedom fighter, he sees himself in the struggle of people of South Sudan and his learning curve about the regime in Khartoum has exponentially improved over the few years. I do not see any reason that would make President Mbaki to be more sympathetic with position of Sudan than that of the South except in the articulation and presentation of the issues. It is a high time for our diplomatic outreach to proactively and objectively engage with AUHIP and UN and to move away from the blaming culture. The failure of the international community to sympathize with our positions is more to do with us than with them. We should not forget that it is the same international community that stood firmly with us during difficult times of our struggle but importantly during peace negotiations and implementation of CPA, particularly the conduct of the referendum.
For this roadmap to succeed it requires a serious diplomatic move, particularly USA and China to encourage the two states to reach solution on the pending issues. Although USA may not have more effective leverage over Khartoum than China, the USA can use its commitment to human rights and democracy to adopt necessary legislations and sanctions against the regime in Khartoum that would expedite democratic transformation and change. China has shown very encouraging diplomatic stance and it is gradually moving towards a balanced diplomatic approach with powerful signal to Khartoum that “things are not the same”. Russia may require a lot of diplomatic work as it may need to be encouraged to realign its strategic interests with those of the South. The South should not also take its neighbors and friends and region for guaranteed as it was well reflected in the surprising and uninformed condemnation of AUPSC of the South for capturing Heglig that it assumed to be a territory of Sudan.
With more realism from the two states and bleak economic future without resumption of oil production and coupled with the close engagement of the international community, the path of war could now be avoided and the two states stand a better chance to be on a track of peace and good relations as prerequisites for their economic and political viability.
Luka Biong Deng is minister of cabinet affairs for the national government of Sudan, and a senior member of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement.
By Elise Keppler*
Liberia’s "big man" surely thought he’d enjoy a comfortable retirement when he left power back in 2003. But on April 26 the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted Charles Taylor for war crimes and crimes against humanity, proving that even the most powerful aren’t immune from justice.
As I watched Taylor looking on somberly as the verdict was read, I recalled that for years, the prospects for Taylor’s surrender looked extremely bleak. Despite an international arrest warrant for him, the Nigerian government offered Taylor safe haven and he went into exile.
The judges at the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone, a mixed international-national war crimes court sitting in The Hague, found Taylor guilty of aiding and abetting all 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity on which he was charged. He was also found guilty of planning the crimes during attacks on three districts in Sierra Leone. This decision is the first of its kind against a head of state.
The conviction is a triumph for the Sierra Leone victims. When I traveled to Freetown in 2004, people consistently told me they wouldn’t consider justice complete for the country’s armed conflict, which ended in 2002, unless Taylor was brought to the dock. Activists emphasized that because of Taylor’s involvement with Sierra Leone’s rebel forces during the conflict, he was central to any effort to hold those responsible to account.
While Taylor got on with a quiet existence in Calabar, Nigeria, activists across West Africa joined with international groups such as Human Rights Watch to campaign for his surrender. We sought to make clear that seeing to it that he faced trial was not simply a matter of “Western concern,” as some critics suggested, and to keep the issue on the international agenda.
President Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s president at the time, indicated he would consider extraditing Taylor to Liberia if a duly elected Liberian president requested it. However, Liberia’s new president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who took office in January 2006, initially indicated that Taylor’s surrender was not a priority. Perhaps partly due to our campaigning, accompanied by urging for Taylor’s surrender by the UK and US governments, Johnson Sirleaf did an about face. In March, explaining that international pressure had made it impossible for Liberia to address other issues until Taylor was surrendered, she submitted a request to the Nigerian government for his transfer.
An international chase that seemed the stuff of Hollywood films followed. But in the end – and with the apparent threat that a scheduled meeting between the Nigerian president and US President George Bush would be cancelled unless Taylor was arrested – Taylor was taken into custody on Nigeria’s border with Cameroon and sent to Freetown. His trial was transferred to The Hague in June 2006 due to concerns over instability if his case were tried in West Africa, and opening arguments began in June 2007.
The trial was complex. Some 115 witnesses testified, more than 1,000 exhibits were admitted, tens of thousands of pages of transcripts were generated, and hundreds of motions were decided. Taylor himself took the stand for nearly seven months.
After more than a year of deliberations, the judges announced their verdict in a session lasting more than two hours, which provided detailed findings on Taylor’s role in committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone. Specifically, the court found that Taylor was individually criminally responsible for the crimes by providing arms and ammunition, military and financial support, and encouragement to the Revolutionary United Front and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, rebel groups responsible for terrorizing civilians, rape, murder, enslavement, and child recruitment, among other crimes. Appeals are now anticipated, while sentencing is scheduled for late May.
Critics of international justice often question the significance of charging suspects when they seem beyond the reach of law. The Taylor verdict shows how short-sighted that perspective is. Though Taylor did not immediately face justice after his indictment was unsealed, he ultimately was taken into custody, tried and judged for his crimes.
The verdict should put fugitives from justice – even at the highest levels of power – on notice. Notably, while President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan who is wanted by the International Criminal Court on crimes committed in Darfur is at liberty today, he may be brought to trial in the future.
Of course, whether suspects are held to account depends on the actions of governments, and the long-term impact of the verdict beyond Sierra Leone rests with countries that are committed to accountability for the worst crimes. Countries that are members of the International Criminal Court, for example, should insist that al-Bashir is surrendered for trial. For crimes not subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction, including crimes committed in Liberia under Taylor’s presidency before the ICC became operational, we look to governments to pursue prosecutions through national courts with international support as needed.
Victims obtained some justice for Taylor’s brutal crimes on April 26. Governments should build upon this landmark decision to ensure that victims everywhere have the same opportunity.
*Elise Keppler is senior counsel with Human Rights Watch’s international justice program.
By Steve Paterno
The relationship between People’s Republic of China and newly independent state of South Sudan has always never been strong. China close ties to the Sudanese regime in Khartoum play significant role in straining relationship between China and South Sudan. Of recent, such already strained relationship is further troubled, when South Sudan accused Chinese oil companies for being in cohort or at least complacence with Khartoum stealing the oil of South Sudan. The accusation resulted into expulsion of Liu Yingcai, the head of China’s oil operating company in the country. The expulsion was accompanied with stern warnings for more repercussion to follow against Chinese involvements in South Sudan. This strenuous relationship is even complicated more, with engagements of Western powers in Sudanese affairs, particularly the USA influence over South Sudan.
However, the current escalation of violences between Khartoum and Juba provides great opportunity for China to amend things and entice South Sudan into developing better relationship with the newly emerged country. China has more at stakes as far as South Sudan is concern. It needs to ensure stable flow of its oil from South Sudan. China is the major importer of oil produced in South Sudan. With the growing influence of the West in the region, China also needs to exert its political and economic influence over South Sudan to offset the challenges and competion of the West. More importantly, China needs to build and foster trust as an strategic partner with South Sudan.
The recent visit by South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir to China amidst ongoing crisis in South Sudan underscores the significance of China-South Sudan relationship. South Sudanese strongest Western ally, the United States of America already bailed out on South Sudan, when the newly emerged country needed a friend at most critical point; facing Khartoum’s flagrant onslaught against the country. In the current border dispute, particularly over Panthou, US completely behaves out of a norm of being a friend, risking losing trust of South Sudan. America was among the first to jump into fray of condemning South Sudan for overrunning Panthou in self defense against Khartoum’s constant aggression. Traditionally, an ally like US would have sticked along with South Sudan, and if it so believes South Sudan violated any international law by militarily taking over Panthou, then it must at least refrain from joining forces with the allies of Khartoum in public condemnation of South Sudan. The US has more leverage and influence in defusing the tension between Sudan and South Sudan than abandoning South Sudan as it has done. As Jendayi Elizabeth Frazer, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, eloquently explained, America needs “to give South Sudan a security blanket,” and tell the North, “if you mess with the South, you mess with the United States.”
Since the US fails on South Sudan, sending the country in isolation undeservingly, South Sudan turns to China, which is complemented with the visit of President’s Salva Kiir into the People’s Republic of China. Unfortunately, China also failed South Sudan. China avoided to address South Sudanese most pressing issues, which is security and oil; specifically Khartoum’s flagrant aggression and constructions of alternative oil pipeline for South Sudan. Even though China pledges to assist South Sudan’s developmental needs in other sectors, South Sudan very existence is threatened security wise and economically by the regime in Khartoum, China’s closest ally. For China to secure its political and economic interest in the region, it must urgently address South Sudanese concerns over the regime in Khartoum.
Thus far, South Sudan already fulfills its international and partnership obligations. Despite overtaking Panthou in self defenses—in bravely military show of force, a land that rightly belongs to South Sudan, but occupied by the North Sudan, the country is able to pull out its troops under intense international pressure. South Sudan government has decided, unilaterally to do things in deescalating the border rows with North Sudan—things which are unpopular with South Sudanese masses. Even worst, South Sudan accepts its citizens to be bombed and killed by Khartoum’s aerial bombardments so as to win the trust of international community and allies. What is left now is the role of international communities to reciprocate South Sudanese friendly gestures. It is up to the allies of South Sudan to prove the worth of friendship. South Sudan already played it roles and cannot play being nice than it has already done. As far as South Sudan’s natural resources are concerned, which draws the interest of friends in the first place, the country has already decided that those resources rather remain deep underneath the ground than exploited by enemies of South Sudan. So, is there a South Sudanese ally out there who is willing to engage in real mutual friendship?
Steve Paterno is the author of The Rev. Fr. Saturnino Lohure, A Romain Catholic Priest Turned Rebel. He can be reached at stevepaterno@yahoo.com
By Luka Biong Deng
April 30, 2012 — There have been a number of concerning statements in the press, in reports from NGOs and third parties, including from Member States of the United Nations and African Union, that Heglig (known as Panthou by most South Sudanese) is an area lying within the territory of the Republic of Sudan. The Republic of South Sudan (South Sudan) was also surprised to hear that so many members of the international community were unaware that South Sudan has claimed this area as its own and consistently included it as one of the disputed areas requiring peaceful settlement with Sudan. This confusion over Panthou also prevails among the people of South Sudan and surprisingly among their leaders. I was particularly shocked by a statement made by a senior member of our government in a high level informal gathering that Heglig has been compromised by the final award of the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal. As I tried to clarify to him certain facts about the ruling of Abyei Arbitration, this senior official kept insisting on his conviction and the more he was arguing the more he was exposing his ignorance about the issue. I came to know that if it could take me such effort to convince a senior official about Heglig, there also must be a knowledge gap for others further away from the talks between the two States.
As the Co-agent of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement together with the Vice President Dr. Riek Machar to the Abyei Boundaries Arbitration Tribunal and a member of the SPLM team for post-referendum negotiation and designated to oversee the work of the Technical Ad-hoc Border committee (often called the "North-South Border Committee"), I would like to clarify the confusion over Panthou (Heglig) and the final award of the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal and the claim of the South Sudan over Panthou. Immediately after the announcement of the final award of the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal on 22nd July 2009, I made statement on the following day in Elsahafa newspaper that the award did not resolve the North-South border and based on the evidence available I said that Heglig remains to be part of Unity State. When I tried to retrieve this statement from the electronic archive of Elshafa newspaper for this article, the access to this statement was specifically denied and restricted by the Sudan national security but I managed to get a hard copy of the newspaper. This tells more about how the regime in Khartoum would like to conceal facts from the public over Heglig.
Despite claims to the contrary, Heglig was absolutely not determined to be part of Sudan (the North) by the July 2009 ruling of the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal (referred by many in South Sudan as the Permanent Court of Arbitration decision (PCA decision). The parties signed an Abyei Arbitration Agreement in 2008 which clearly provided that the mandate of the arbitration tribunal was simply to determine if the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) exceeded its mandate and if it did, to then "define (i.e. delimit) on map the boundaries of the area of the nine
Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905." (see http://www.pca- cpa.org/upload/files/Abyei%20Arbitration %20Agreement.pdf). This is what the tribunal did. As a result, the PCA decision only defined the border limits of the Abyei Area. The tribunal issued no opinion with respect to the political status or location of Heglig or any other area in Sudan or now South Sudan. Indeed, in the entire 286 pages of the PCA decision, the tribunal mentions Heglig only once and that was simply to describe the Ngok Dinka’s assertion that there were permanent settlements and agricultural areas in Heglig back in 1905. (see http://www.pca- cpa.org/upload/files/ Abyei%20Final%20Award.pdf).
In particular, the Tribunal rules that the ABC Experts were not in excess of mandate regarding their decision over the southern boundary of the Abyei Area. The final and binding decision of ABC states that the Southern Boundary shall be the Kordofan-Bahr el-Ghazal-Upper Nile boundary as it was defined on 1st January 1956. As a result, arguing that the PCA decision determined the status of Heglig has as much validity as arguing that it also determined the political status and location of Juba or El Obeid — simply because neither of those cities were found to be within the Abyei Area.
Regarding South Sudan’s claim on Heglig, this is not a new assertion of South Sudan. For years now South Sudan has consistently and openly claimed Heglig as part of its territory, including (i) in the context of the Technical Ad-hoc border Committee established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), (ii) after the issuance of the PCA decision, and (iii) within the context of the negotiations with the Government of Sudan as facilitated by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP).
During the deliberations of the Technical Ad-hoc border Committee the South Sudanese delegation consistently raised its claims to Heglig, albeit the Government of Sudan refused to acknowledge those claims. The disputing claims over the area were well known and the difference of opinions on Heglig were evidenced, for example, in the October 24, 2010 joint letter of the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the technical committee outlining the "Views of the Parties on the Disputed Areas." This letter was written and presented to the Joint Political Committee (of the National Congress Party and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement). In the document, the NCP’s Chairman, Professor Adallah Sadiq, listed four disputed areas and the Deputy Chair, Riek DeGaol Juer, then presented (8) disputed areas which included what was referred to as the ’South Kordofan/Unity state sector (Heglig). Furthermore, immediately after the PCA decision was released Vice President Riak stated that Heglig’s final status would need to be determined by the Technical Ad-hoc Border Committee established by the CPA. For instance, as reported by the Sudan Tribune on July 27, 2009, the Vice President stated that Heglig was not part of the ruling in the Hague, but "It will be resolved in the North-South border demarcation process.
Additionally, the Government of Southern Sudan prior to secession and the Government of South Sudan post-secession, repeatedly asserted in the context of the AUHIP-facilitated negotiations with the Government of Sudan claiming Heglig as belonging to South Sudan and therefore placing it on the list of "disputed areas" requiring further settlement. For instance, on June 28, 2011 and in November 2011, SPLM/GoSS and South Sudan respectively submitted a clear written proposal stating "The six (6) disputed areas are: (i) Wanthou (Joda); (ii) Maganis; (iii) Kaka; (iv) Northern Bahr el Ghazal; (v) Kaffia Kanje and Hofrat el Nahas; and (vi) Panthou (Heglig)". South Sudan tabled similar language during the February 2012 round of negotiations, and reaffirmed this position in its oral and written submissions made during the March 2012 negotiations. Indeed, the failure of the parties to agree on the list of disputed areas (including Heglig) and to agree on the mechanism for settlement —with the South proposing international arbitration, is the primary reason an agreement addressing the disputed border areas was never even initialed in March 2012.
What is indisputable is that South Sudan claims Heglig as theirs and Sudan claims it as theirs. The fact that Sudan has refused to "agree" that it is disputed ---both in the context of the Technical Ad-hoc Border Committee and in the Addis negotiations— does not make it any less a disputed area. Those who would refuse to support the submission of Heglig to a peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms because it is not an "agreed disputed area" are playing a dangerous game by leaving a critical matter unresolved between the parties which can result in continued hostilities. The purpose of the negotiations is to address such matters, not leave them to foment distrust and violence in the future.
In closing, as shown from the above, the PCA decision did not decide the final status of the Heglig area and South Sudan’s claim over the area and its status therefore as a disputed area as between the two States is not a new claim, but rather one that has been consistently made for several years and witnessed by the AUHIP and other observers to the Addis negotiations.
Luka Biong Deng is a senior member of South Sudan’s ruling SPLM.
By Zechariah Manyok Biar
April 29, 2012 — Before turning to what Sudan is preaching these days that South Sudan initiates aggressions, I would like to write about something that might not be popular at this time when we are facing external challenges. The reason why I am writing about this topic is that we must always keep our house in order before spitting at those who say nonsense about us.
During the North-South civil war in Sudan, what used to make no sense to me was the slogan: “Time is money.” It did not make sense to me because I was a little Dinka cattle keeper who joined the SPLA and stayed where time was not money at all. We had a lot of time to play cards and other nonsense, including sleeping during the day, but there was still time. It was when I went for my higher education that I understood clearly that the slogan of “Time is money” was real. Now I experience that the university study is even less demanding than the world of work.
Yet, I see something different going on here in Juba. Time does not seem to count as money for our government. I wonder when I see our government not seeing the reality that everybody feels here in Juba, regardless of what they do. Teachers and students feel it, traders feel it, taxi drivers feel it, boda-boda cyclists feel it, and the list is longer. But government officials do not seem to feel it.
Yesterday (April 27, 2012) when our President returned from China, every other activity in Juba stopped for more than two hours. We were waiting for the President. Every road was blocked and the airport became lifeless.
This was not the first time I witnessed this problem. Two months ago, I was asked by the National Commission for War Disabled, Widows and Orphans to facilitate their strategic planning and leadership workshop in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal. When we left our offices for the airport to board the hired plane, we found that every road leading to the airport was blocked. We stayed for two hours before the President arrived from Ethiopia. The plane was waiting for us in the airport. In the real business world, a second counts. Somebody must have lost a sizable income that day.
Not only that, commercial planes could not leave the airport. If the losses of those delayed were counted, how much could that be? Considering that one bigger airplane could go to Nairobi twice a day, going and coming back means money in the truest sense of the word. If you cut out one trip, how much do you think it costs the company and we expect them to pay taxes?
Let us say we do not care about those companies, anyway. Don’t we also care about our own productivity and losses? What is the cost of stopping government officials from carrying out their different assignments in town in timely manner?
May be we are paying for something important to us. But what about diplomats, are they also obliged to do the same? Considering that a diplomat is coming from his/her country and has calculated the time he/she would spend in Juba to conduct some important meetings before moving on to another country, would he/she suspend his/her activities because we are waiting for our President?
One could argue that I am being insensitive about the security of our President. I respect such argument. But what is more dangerous between allowing unscreened people line up by the road to cheer up the President and allowing government workers move about, thirty minutes before the arrival of the President? Yesterday when the President came back from China, shops were even closed here in Juba town so that people could go and welcome the President. Do you know who own these shops? Is that more secured for the President to let these people stand by the roadside, if security was the issue for blocking roads?
Somebody would convince me otherwise, but I think blocking roads in Juba because the President is passing is more costly than we realized. It is logical if the security people should be given accurate information about the time that the President would arrive so that roads are blocked ten to twenty minutes before his arrival. Otherwise, let us not cry that we do not have enough money to run our businesses when productivity is often disabled intentionally.
Zechariah Manyok Biar lives in Juba, Republic of South Sudan. He can be reached at manyok34@gmail.com
An Urgent Recalibration of Diplomatic Measures and Pressures is Required
By Eric Reeves
April 28, 2012 — Traveling to South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains in January 2003, months after a ceasefire agreement had been signed between North and South, an unnerving conviction, a grim certainty, was expressed to me by every military and civil society official I spoke with, including John Garang, the deceased former leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Sudanese vice president: if war comes again to Sudan, it will be the most destructive of all our wars. This was an extraordinary observation coming from people who had just begun to emerge from a civil war that claimed well over 2 million lives and displaced between 4 and 5 million civilians. The prediction was made not in a bellicose spirit, but as a matter of fact, something that should be clear to anyone who understood the nature of the military forces in the North and the South, and the conduct of war by northern governments, including the current National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) regime, between 1983 and 2005. In recent weeks, those terrible premonitions from 2003 seem on the verge of becoming a vast and uncontrollable reality.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) leadership has long understood, according to numerous Sudanese I have spoken to in the last decade, that there would be no international guarantors of the security arrangements in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), completed in 2004 and finally signed on January 9, 2005. The SPLM/A was adamant about maintaining its own army, because in the event that the NIF/NCP regime violated the peace, no other country would offer meaningful help or protection to the South.
The moment they had feared appears almost at hand. In the last few weeks, the SPLA has repeatedly repulsed a (northern) Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) assault on the border settlement of Tishwin in Unity State, South Sudan. In the process of driving the SAF north, the SPLA temporarily seized the critical oil hub of Heglig, which lies in a complicated and contested border area (Heglig is called Panthou by most Southerners). The fighting was particularly significant in the wake of Khartoum’s May 2011 seizure of the large Abyei area just to the west of Heglig---another contested area of immense significance to southerners, and in which Heglig had been placed by the CPA’s Abyei Boundaries Commission.
The SPLA withdrew forces from Heglig at the behest of the international community (or, according to Khartoum, pressure from the SAF), but the situation is now explosive. As of today, the northern Sudanese regime was openly bombing targets across the border from Heglig. The NIF/NCP regime, particularly its increasingly militarist generals, was humiliated by the ease of the SPLA victory at Heglig. A vehement, angry rhetoric dominates all its pronouncements, despite concerns about imperiling the infrastructure at a site that produces half of what remains of northern oil production. (Much damage has already been reported, most of it from inaccurate bombing and shelling by the SAF.)
The leadership in Juba, South Sudan, initially demanded as a condition of withdrawal that the UN assure that Heglig would not be used to stage further attacks on the South. (The recent major assault on South Sudan was not the first in recent weeks, and has been accompanied by a steady increase in aerial attacks on southern territory.) But there has been no follow-up on creating a UN buffer zone between the two forces. Further conflict seems inevitable without meaningful diplomatic engagement, which we have yet to see.
Sudan’s long civil war was fought between a guerilla insurgency and a national army with substantial assistance from proxy militias. If the recent fighting precipitates war between North and South Sudan, it will be a conflict between two very powerful military forces. The South would have better logistics, communications, and transport than it did during the 1983-2005 conflict, while the SAF will again be fighting far away from Khartoum. The SAF will also have a far more difficult time forcibly conscripting recruits from regions it formerly counted on, including Blue Nile, South Kordofan, Darfur, and South Sudan itself, since it is presently waging war in all those territories.
Perhaps most important, the people of the South generally feel that if war comes, they will be fighting for their survival, given Khartoum’s unconstrained military ambitions. SPLA morale is correspondingly much higher than in the SAF, which is spread very thin. There are credible reports about splits within the SAF over the decision to go to war with South Sudan. Moreover, all evidence suggests that the SAF is being badly mauled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North in months of brutal fighting within the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan. Khartoum’s response has been an increasing reliance on bombing, long-range artillery, advanced rocket launchers---"stand-off weaponry"---and the ruthless determination to starve and deny humanitarian assistance to the people of the Nuba Mountains as a way of ending the insurgency. But crushing defeats of the SAF in military encounters with the SPLA-North are increasingly in evidence, and this is taking a significant toll on the larger military force.
Over the past year, fighting has spread from Abyei to South Kordofan to Blue Nile to the border regions, and in each instance Khartoum has been the clear aggressor, evidently convinced that it can somehow seize southern oil fields or create a situation on the ground that will strengthen its negotiating position. The SAF began (or, rather, resumed) indiscriminate aerial assaults on civilians in November 2010, shortly before the southern self-determination referendum. This has accelerated in recent months and weeks; the very recent bombing of Bentiu, a major city and the capital of Unity State, signals a willingness to attack civilians on a large scale.
For its part, the leadership in Juba is bewildered and dismayed. While appropriately fearing the military threat posed by Khartoum, the SPLM/A did not anticipate during peace negotiations that it would be abandoned diplomatically, allowing Khartoum to pick which elements of the CPA Protocols it would observe and which it would ignore. To understand the current dire situation, we must remember that the international community never secured from Khartoum good faith participation in negotiations over delineation and demarcation of the North/South border, per the explicit terms of the CPA.
South Sudanese President Salva Kiir knows that, as the leader of an impoverished new nation with few friends, he must place the diplomatic ball in the international court if negotiations with Khartoum to reduce the present level of violence are to succeed. Unfortunately, he was denied the assistance he needed to de-escalate the fighting in the Tishwin/Heglig area. Instead, Kiir and the South Sudanese leadership stood accused by the UN, the AU, the EU, the UK, and the United States of military aggression against northern Sudanese territory, even though all evidence---from UN observers from the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), journalists on the ground, and oil workers---points to Khartoum as the clear aggressor in both major assaults on Tishwin.
Some of the confusion in international reporting comes from a failure to follow the course of the dispute over the Abyei border region, which Khartoum seized a year ago. Following Khartoum’s military assault on Abyei town in May 2008, the southern leadership---convinced that the matter could not be resolved militarily---concluded that "final and binding" arbitration of the Abyei border issue was essential, and succeeded in bringing the matter before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the Hague. Though in many ways unfavorable to Juba, the PCA ruling was nonetheless accepted. Khartoum’s land grab last year flouted the court’s "final and binding" ruling, issued in July 2009, which defined the area in which the critical Abyei self-determination referendum was to be held. This abrogation of a key protocol called into serious question Khartoum’s commitment to honor the CPA.
The PCA ruling, it should be noted, did nothing to settle where the "1 January 1956 border" lies. It had no mandate to make such a determination, which was to be determined by post-CPA negotiations between Juba and Khartoum. But feeling no real international pressure, Khartoum never engaged in good faith negotiations on the North/South border, which has shifted steadily southward since 1956. Indeed, Khartoum used its military to prevent demarcation of areas in Abyei that had already been delineated, as international leaders rarely acknowledge. And yet the South has mostly faced one-sided denunciations for its incursion into Heglig, from the U.S. State Department, the UK minister for Africa, the chief EU foreign policy official, and the African Union. These international actors, along with the UN Security Council, are silent on the seizure of Abyei even though they presume to judge the location of the North/South border, an issue that is very much on the negotiating table so long as Abyei remains occupied by Khartoum. These peremptory judgments unwittingly but effectively encourage the regime to remain intransigent in any future negotiations on the location of the border.
In one of the few sensible diplomatic statements during the present crisis, Norway proposed a Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mission, reiterating a previous proposal that was stymied by Khartoum. Juba likely wishes for nothing so much as an active and robust JBVM Mission. Only Khartoum benefits from ambiguous borders, and an ability to project military power without a clearly defined tripwire. The ambiguity of the border has also permitted the North to build a secret "tie-in" oil pipeline in Heglig that would have had the capacity to siphon off as much as 25,000 barrels of crude from southern oil fields per day.
The outlook for North and South Sudan is extremely bleak. There is no evidence of countervailing forces to bring Khartoum back from its present characterization of the fighting as "South Sudan’s blatant invasion of Heglig"---an "invasion" that requires a massive military retaliation. If there is to be a chance of peace, the factitious parceling out of equal blame to Juba and Khartoum must end. To be sure, the odds of changing this decades-long pattern seem exceedingly small next to the likelihood of war.
At the same time, the UNMISS force in South Sudan needs better transport and logistics to ensure that it can re-deploy more rapidly, and should include a Border Verification and Monitoring team like the one Norway proposed. Khartoum will resist, and may make deployment impossible in many areas; this fact should then be made widely known. UNMISS must also be freed of UN political manipulation. Currently, UN political officials conceal most of the mission’s findings despite the fact that they make clear that the military actions reported by Southerners and the SPLA have occurred. UN political suppression of observations and investigations that have direct bearing in assigning responsibility for the current military situation is deeply irresponsible.
For border delineation to begin in earnest, substantial diplomatic commitment will be needed. Immediately following delineation of any section of the border, the UN should begin demarcation as a means of creating a credible, effective tripwire along the North/South border to prevent, if possible, future aggressive military actions against the South by Khartoum.
In all likelihood, none of these measures will be taken, with Khartoum’s obduracy used to justify diplomatic fecklessness. But the responsibility for that war will not be Khartoum’s alone. It will be shared by the international leaders who chose the expedient route, even with millions of lives at risk.
Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has published extensively on Sudan, nationally and internationally, for more than a decade. He is author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide.
By Magdi El Gizouli
April 25, 2012 — Following the lead of President Bashir the Sudan News Agency (SUNA) started using the term hashara, a pun on haraka (movement), when referring to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). President Bashir also suggested tadmeer (destruction) instead of tahreer (liberation) but only hashara caught on. The resemblance with inyenzi (cockroaches), the term used by Hutu extremists to depict their Tutsi enemies in the run up to the 1994 Rwanda massacres, cannot be missed. The President inaugurated the public use of hashara in his victory speech to a company of Sudanese troops in al-Kurmuk, once the stronghold of the SPLM-North in the Blue Nile, on 6 November 2011, granting the observer a glimpse into the combat obscenities of the SAF.
President Bashir popularized the term in two mobilisation speeches preceding the Sudanese army’s reclaim of Heglig, one in the National Congress Party (NCP) headquarters in Khartoum and another in al-Obeid, the capital of Kordofan state, and in two others celebrating the victory on 20 April. In these last events the cheering crowds would not settle for anything less than the hashara. Abd al-Rahman al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the President’s assistant and son of the National Umma Party (NUP) boss, was booed to silence when he suggested that Sudan and South Sudan would eventually have to cooperate. When the President rose to speak he was welcomed with the cheer kul al-guwa juba juwa – all the force into Juba, a recycle of the battle cry of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) kul al-guwa al-khartoum juwa – all the force into Khartoum, followed by al-shaab yureed tahreer al-janub – the people want the liberation of South [Sudan]. The President said the SAF would proceed to crush the hasharat (pl.) in South Kordofan and the Blue Nile but made no mention of the declaration two days earlier that his plan was now to topple the SPLM regime in Juba. The audience was not satisfied prompting the President to make another of his stage decisions. Sudan’s pipelines will remain closed to South Sudanese oil even if Juba agrees to grant Khartoum the 50% share it enjoyed during the six years interim period of the expired Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), announced an elated Bashir, igniting another round of nationalist orgasms among the crowd.
Emboldened by the President’s sanction individual patriots rehabilitated the words abd (slave) and farkh (a descendant of slaves) for use in the public domain when referring to the South Sudanese. The racial slurs are in themselves not novel; they constitute elements of the ideological baggage of Sudan’s ruling class. Novel however is their unashamed public employment. I came across a salvo of such insults in the comments section of a Youtube recording of a South Sudan Television interview with Barnaba Marial Benjamin, the country’s Minister of Information, in which he asserted that the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) had pulled out of Heglig and was not defeated by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). The Minister ridiculed the victory celebrations in Khartoum saying the Sudanese government was fooling itself and its people.
Followers of Mohamed Abd al-Karim, a particularly zealous Islamist cleric, took things a step further last Saturday. The assailants stormed a compound of the Evangelical Church in the Khartoum suburb al-Jireif, ransacked the buildings and burned Bibles after breaking through a police cordon. Abd al-Karim allegedly incited the attack in a sermon delivered the day before. No casualties were recorded. The popular committee of al-Jireif, a neighbourhood level administrative organ, laid claim to the land occupied by the church a month before. Abd al-Karim, said the pastor of the church, told worshippers in the mosque where he preaches nearby to go and seize what is theirs. The Undersecretary of the Ministry for Religious Endowments, Hamid Yusif, paid a visit to the church the next day and in an address to its congregation, a mix of South Sudanese, Sudanese from the Nuba Mountains, Eritreans and Ethiopians, promised an investigation into the incident. The Ministry, he said, “condemns this attack and considers it an extremist act born out of individual religious opinion”, an opinion he described as “false and misguided”.
The “misguided” opinion Mr Undersecretary is certainly not individual; it is propagated daily by al-Intibaha, ubiquitous among the NCP high priests, sanctioned by the state, and has long become the working ideology of an urban mob.
The author is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. He publishes regular opinion articles and analyses at his blog Still Sudan. He can be reached at m.elgizouli@gmail.com
By Isaiah Abraham
April 24, 2012 — Though Khartoum was to go for extra futile military mile to fight the people of South Sudan over Panthou, our big brother President Salva Kiir has made a reckless decision to pull out our troops from that land. The defeated Khartoum forces return singing when they should have been weeping throughout their lives, after we tied them down when we control every piece that rightfully belongs to us right there in Panthou and its surroundings.
It is a shame we just left that land without any provisions from those who called themselves world leaders. They must be enjoying now that Khartoum is bombing Rubkhona and Bentiu targeting unarmed innocent civilians.
On the issue of Panthou, everyone thought that the case should have been pursued first, before thinking of pulling out, but alas, the president of our Republic ordered out Southern Army with no single guarantee that the disputed land shall remain under certain arrangement, be it demilitarization or United Nations forces to occupy it until the owner of that land becomes clearer. Now that we are out of Panthou, and Khartoum entered it peacefully under claims of pressure by someone, what will the ordinary Southern soldier say, the very one who was earlier told to defend it?
Kiir must resign; he failed our people at a crucial time when we badly need his leadership. He did the same thing by not protecting Abyei from Khartoum and all lucrative areas along South-North borders are firmly taken over by Khartoum, what does our Chief Executive (Mr. President) want to do first before he defend the territorial integrity of the people of South Sudan? Relying on the world leaders to come for our aid has proven illusive and will never happen.
People are sick and tired of lame duck (Kiir) that only roar once, and never bite. He echoed first well that ’he will not order the withdrawal of SPLA and from nowhere beat an about turn to the surprise of many people on our streets who were ready to go for anything against the NCP in Khartoum. Kiir must pack and go home. What he has done to withdraw our men unconditionally in Panthou is a betrayal of the cause of the people of South Sudan. Pulling out of SPLA troops was a mistake!
The enemy is following us up as you can see how they become so bolstered and enliven to bomb deep inside our towns at will. Where is the so-called international community Dr. Marial was talking about?
Kiir talked of attacks by Sudan Armed Forces as one of his main reasons for capturing Panthou, but the people of South Sudan were for the ownership of the Panthou. They died, and are maimed to protect that land, and the president should have been conscious of what is popular. Nagging of Arabs was too much, and something could have been done and sustained no matter what.
How come he could easily bowed to New York or Addis Ababa people who never lifted a finger to stop Khartoum from raining fire on our people day and night despite our cry? Mr. President, the interest of our people comes first. Ban Ki-moon (known then in Korea as Ban-jusa) is a letdown and an enemy of our people. Our land can’t be ruled from New York, we are own masters. Our voice was loud, but you kept personalizing the matter, who do you think you are?
The issue of Panthou is larger than the president, rather is about South Sudan pride and dignity. If the people of Southern Sudan were ready, even to contribute their own lives and money, why stand own their way Mr. Kiir? You have been inconsistence through out, and you got to give way. Sir you are one of the leaders that will be remembered for allowing his land to go (Chief Deng Majok was one) because someone who sits in New York or Washington rules over this land. You are a disgraced.
If it was a defeat we would have taken it head high, and regroup and return there. What is wrong if we had stood the ground and be defeated, (an impossible thing anyway for our men against Khartoum)? Armies retreat but the war would be on. Our people are very agitated including this author for the decision to pull out troops from Panthou, the 100% South Sudan land. Juba has failed our people big way this time around. Mr. Kiir Mayardit low self-esteemed personality has made him one of the worse leaders our people have ever had.
Men died once, and Khartoum shouldn’t have been allowed to follow us up again after all that lost during the liberation of our land (from 1955-2005). Who will lead the people of South Sudan if the likes of brother Kiir could easily change colors in the face of challenges? Parliament therefore must impeach this man called Kiir for his betrayal of his people for Abyei case and now Panthou.
It would have been better for Khartoum to capture Panthou by force, rather than to run away cowardly because of Obama or Ki-moon? I must repeat myself there. It would have been a good case if they did just that, something we could followed up through other means, even that of The Hague for Arbitration. Kiir has snuffed lives of our men only to give in to outsiders. Shame on Kiir, he resigns!
Isaiah Abraham lives in Juba; Isaiah_abraham@yahoo.co.uk
By Zechariah Manyok Biar
There is always something comical in the way that Sudanese leaders behave. They can tell you that something does not exist and expect you to believe it without further questions. I think that is how dictators behave everywhere.
Yesterday night, I almost believed the Sudanese version of events when they said they captured Heglig by force and were sending in journalists to see for themselves.
I got up this Saturday morning, April 21, 2012, and started phoning our people from within Juba and in Unity State to find out whether our army was defeated by Sudan Armed Forces contrary to what I know as the compliance with the international community for the withdrawal from Heglig, and the answer was the same. No Sudanese army attacked our forces yesterday in Heglig. Our forces are withdrawing orderly and peacefully based on our President’s orders.
That was not enough for me. I checked every major news website to see what they have to say, and was convinced by France International News which reported this:
“The government (Sudan) on Friday night said it had organised a trip to Heglig for journalists. But an AFP correspondent who went to the airport in Khartoum early Saturday was told the trip was cancelled because Heglig’s airport could not yet receive planes.” This amused me. Why do Sudanese leaders think they can lie and not be discovered?
I think the reason why they do this is that they find their people accepting lies without further questions. They have somehow been lying to the international community and succeeded. They, for example, often bomb our territories and deny it. Recently, they bombed Bentiu, killing five people and they denied it even though UNMISS is present in the area. They bombed UNMISS compound at Mayom County in Unity State and denied it. All this, unfortunately, is accepted as truth by some countries in the international community.
Now Sudanese leaders are turning our respect for international law into weakness and some countries are about to believe them. This disturbs most of us here in South Sudan. It looks like those who respect international laws are the ones who suffer.
How many times have we told a story that could easily be verified and nobody took us seriously? How many times have we complained to the international community about the violation of our sovereignty by the Sudanese government and nobody paid attention to that? How many times have we told the international community with evidence that Sudan was supporting rebels against us and nobody cared? Is it because we are seen as weak so peace should be kept in the region at our expenses? Is that what justice is in the international community?
The UN Secretary General recently called our presence at Heglig as "an infringement on the sovereignty of Sudan and a clearly illegal act," but he never did the same for the occupation of Jau by Sudanese army some months ago. He did not say anything stronger against the Sudanese army’s occupation of Abyei and the removal of its administration even though the act has led to the displacement of many civilians in the area, placing their lives in danger.
I do not know if I have answers to these questions and do not think the Secretary General can give us better answers too. What I know is that we are seen as a sacrificial lamb that is used to calm Sudan down. Are we cursed because we are trying to be a free people living in a free country?
The selective nature of UN morality is disturbing to me. It always disturbs me to see that some leaders commit atrocities like what happened in Libya and they pay for it, while some other leaders commit similar atrocities like in Syria and they get away with it. That is double standard morality.
The same double standard morality is being applied to us here where Sudanese violate international laws several times and a blind eye is turned against them by the UN, while less than one percent of what Sudanese do causes uproar around the world if we do it. Is that the morality we can rely on in the international community? Should we in South Sudan learn to be liars so that we survive like the Sudanese?
Zechariah Manyok Biar lives in Juba, Republic of South Sudan. He can be reached at manyok34@gmail.com
This article was originally published on the Amnesty International website:
South Sudan/Sudan: The human rights crisis behind the political spat
By Alex Neve & Khairunissa Dhala
Juba, South Sudan
“Have they forgotten about us?”
Sudanese refugee, Yida Refugee Camp, South Sudan
The spectre of war between Sudan and South Sudan has loomed large during our time at the Yida refugee camp over the past week.
Along the increasingly tense border, the mounting conflict between the two countries has loomed in the background as both a distant spectacle and a sinister threat.
But many refugees are concerned that amidst the spiralling possibility of war, they feel increasingly forgotten.
Each day has brought fresh reports of the deterioration in the relationship between the two countries, dimming the hopes for peace after South Sudan’s independence in July 2011 ended a protracted civil war and mass human rights violations.
South Sudan has occupied Sudan’s Heglig oil fields, though has today ordered its troops to withdraw. Bombs have rained down from Sudanese Antonovs and MiG fighter jets which streak through the skies above South Sudan’s northernmost regions. The rhetoric in the two capitals, Juba and Khartoum, is full of defiance and warmongering.
The international community has certainly taken notice. Numerous world leaders, the UN Secretary-General and Security Council, and the African Union have all gone on the record, calling on the two governments to pull back from the brink of war and to recommit to the peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes related to finalizing their new border and divvying up lucrative oil revenues.
What seems lost in the march to war is that for hundreds of thousands of civilians living along this troubled border – particularly in Sudan’s restive Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states – insecurity, fear and massive human rights violations have already been their reality for 10 long months.
The Sudanese government’s heavy-handed response to the armed campaign mounted by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army – North in the area has been marked by indiscriminate aerial and ground attacks.
With countless deaths and injuries and hundreds of thousands of people forced to flee, Amnesty International has repeatedly documented this appalling human rights and humanitarian crisis.
In Yida and other refugee camps in South Sudan we have seen and heard first-hand the many ways in which this crisis has not abated.
Certainly, abuses and suffering continue across the border in Sudan.
An 18-year-old girl told us how she watched on as a shrapnel fragment from an aerial bomb killed her 3-year-old sister. As she described it, “one moment we were running for safety and then suddenly she was dead.”
A 38-year-old man described to us how his brother, father and uncle were all shot dead by Sudanese troops at the front door of their family home.
There are many other tragic stories of death and destruction.
New refugee arrivals, desperate to reach Yida before the impending rainy season makes passage impossible, are streaming in at a rate of some 200 per day.
All talk of their fear of the continuing attacks and of the widespread hunger because it is impossible to plant crops in these conditions. The Sudanese government meanwhile blocks humanitarian aid to the area.
Life is not easy in South Sudan’s refugee camps either.
They are isolated and difficult to reach, and providing a regular supply of water and food is a great challenge.
A disagreement between refugee leaders and UN agencies about whether Yida should be recognized as a permanent camp or a transit centre en route to locations further inside South Sudan, has meant that essential supplies – such as tarpaulins to protect shelters from the rains – have not yet been distributed.
A small number of international organizations are doing important work against great odds at Yida, but UN organizations such as the refugee agency UNHCR and UNICEF are – to date – virtually absent.
Refugee children are particularly vulnerable. A staggering 6,200 children – one-third of the camp’s population – are attending primary school at Yida. But there is no funding for their education. They are being taught by the camp’s 136 volunteer teachers.
Among the students are hundreds of unaccompanied refugee girls, several of whom have spoken to us of the terrible insecurity they face living in the camp.
And with the area’s infamous rainy season deluge only three weeks away, all of this is only going to get worse.
That’s unless there is urgent and concerted action taken on both sides of the border and by the international community to bring this human rights crisis to an end.
Human rights violations – particularly indiscriminate military attacks – must stop, immediately, in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. And the Sudanese government must allow unhindered humanitarian assistance throughout the area.
The UN for its part should spearhead an all-out effort to ensure the wide-ranging and pressing needs of Yida’s refugee population (which could increase by many thousands over the coming weeks) are met, before rains put them largely beyond reach.
The prospect of a war between Sudan and South Sudan should clearly be a pressing concern for the international community. But the human rights crisis that already exists must not be forgotten.
Alex Neve is the Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada and Khairunissa Dhala is Amnesty International’s South Sudan Researcher
Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART)
PRESS RELEASE
April 18, 2012
A humanitarian catastrophe inflicted by Khartoum
Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART) returned yesterday from visiting people displaced from Blue Nile State, the Nuba Mountains and Abyei.
Khartoum’s policies of ethnic cleansing are inflicting suffering and death:
1. Aerial bombardment, day and night, by Khartoum’s Antonovs, MiGs and helicopter gunships, and long range missiles, have killed and injured countless civilians, and displaced more than half a million from Abyei, Southern Kordofan (Nuba Mountains) and Blue Nile. Khartoum has also bombed targets across the international border in South Sudan (five bombs were dropped on Bentui, Unity State, the day after we left), terrorizing South Sudanese civilians and refugees.
2. Refugees from bombardment: 100,000 from Abyei; 140,000 from Blue Nile State; and 20,000 from Nuba Mountains are living in camps in South Sudan. Conditions in the camps are dire and will become catastrophic with the imminent rainy season, when road access will be impossible, the land becomes a quagmire, or as feared in Jamam Camp, underwater, and incidence of disease may multiply to epidemic proportions.
3. At least 300,000 civilians and Nuba Mountains, and 100,000 in Blue Nile, displaced by aerial bombardment and ground offensives, are hiding in caves or forests, with no effective shelter or access to essential supplies including food and water. Khartoum has continued to deny access to aid organisations, and once the rains begin, they will be unreachable.
4. ‘Returnees’: Al-Bashir’s policy of denying citizenship to those with family connections in South Sudan, and widely reported messages that “that the Government doesn’t want any black people in Khartoum”, and the threat of enforced expulsion, have caused tens of thousands of citizens living in the north to emigrate to South Sudan, often being denied the opportunity to bring belongings with them. Many have never lived in South Sudan and their integration will be logistically challenging, even apart from the humanitarian crisis confronting them. Many of those we met in the camps near Renk, especially those newly arrived, have only a flimsy makeshift shelter, which will provide no protection in the rainy season.
The controversial attack by the SPLA on Heglig: HART is fully aware of the criticisms and response by the SPLM/A who claim that this was a defensive action to prevent Government of Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) from continuing its alleged advance from Heglig onto South Sudan’s territory, and using Heglig as a base for shelling targets inside South Sudan. A Presidential Statement specified: “The Republic of South Sudan is prepared to withdraw its forces from Heiglig if a clear mechanism and guarantee can be provided that Heglig will not be used to launch another attack against South Sudan.”
We also note with concern that Government of Sudan forces still occupy Abyei, preventing the return of many displaced people to their homes in the town and surrounding villages.
We would urge the international community not to allow the issues concerning military offensives by either side to distract from the immediate and urgent need to provide humanitarian assistance to those who will be affected by the imminent rainy season both in South Sudan and in Sudan.
One refugee in Yida Camp, from the Nuba Mountains said “The children need a better life than this one. Are the white people on the same side as Khartoum? Why have they not done anything?”
ENDS
A full report of HART’s findings is attached.
By Magdi El Gizoul
April 18, 2012 — Khartoum and Juba have only adrenaline to compensate for their loss of oil. In their frenzied attempt to secure the highest returns conceivable from the unsustainable resource, their joint placenta as it were, the governments of Sudan and South Sudan are now effectively plunging into its flames. The allegory of burning moths would have been suitable were it not for the profuse blood been shed at the altar of oil.
To the empiricist the current war between the two countries flakes layers of ideological camouflage from an essential dispute over oil. Through this prism a retrospective investigation of the 1983 insurgency led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), the ruling power in the independent South Sudan today, could come to the conclusion that Bentiu was responsible. The capital of ‘Unity state’, a name cynically conferred on the region by President Nimaryi, was expected to host Sudan’s first refinery and enrich the coffers of the regional government of southern Sudan in Juba through corporation and export tax. Nimayri, however, chose to enstrange his southern Sudanese allies, his partners in the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement, and accommodate the Khartoum establishment bosses with whom he had reconciled in 1977 after years of confrontation that peaked with the 1976 trans-Saharan coup attempt orchestrated by the Umma Party, Hassan al-Turabi’s Islamic Movement and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) figure, Hussein al-Hindi, under Qaddafi’s patronage. In 1980 the rayes ordered the construction of the promised refinery in Kosti on the White Nile, but the promise remained just that. He was deposed by a popular uprising in 1985 before he could reap the profits of Chevron’s 1978 discoveries near Bentiu and Heglig. The next rayes, President Bashir, built three refineries, the largest in Khartoum, and two smaller facilities in al-Obeid and Port Sudan, nodes in an export pipeline extending from the oil fields to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
This narrative, by its very empiricism, shortcuts the decisive question of why the successive Khartoum regimes behaved as they did, included in glory is the Anglo-Egyptian colonial order they inherited composite with extractive economy and state ideology. The standard answer to this question is race, religion and culture, as can be read in any news article on the Sudans. The racial argument, however, turns a construct into an essence, and does little to explain the dynamics which, for instance, led Paulino Matip, today the SPLA’s second in command, and his captains, to side with the northern jallaba against the SPLA/M. It was Matip’s militia that secured the Bentiu and Heglig oilfields for exploration and production. When the SPLA briefly captured Heglig in August 2001 it did not battle the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) proper but Matip’s army. Peter Gadet led the SPLA’s operations at the time, the same man who under Matip commanded the militia force which cleared the entire area of its human occupants to make way for the industry. Gadet formed the South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army in April 2011 with the objective of overthrowing the SPLM government in Juba. He dropped the plan four months later to re-join the SPLA, and was named last month deputy commander of Juba’s disarmament campaign in Jonglei. Khartoum has no Matip this time and failed to lure Gadet.
Whether the ever elusive 1956 border passes north or south of the Heglig oil field is today of only rhetorical significance, material for the chauvinist propaganda in Khartoum and Juba. The concrete border rips right through it, and its landmarks are the disputed terms of oil division between the two countries. Harry Verhoeven, speaking to Reuters recently, chose the term “war of attrition” to describe the current military confrontation between Juba and Khartoum. The, attrition, however is not only mutual but self-defeating. The oil industry of the Sudans is like the corpus of the believers in the famed hadeeth, if one organ is harmed the others follow suit. The stakes are high, sure, but not beyond the reach of the marketplace. Until Khartoum and Juba are knocked back into bargaining with words corpses will do the communication.
The author is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. He publishes regular opinion articles and analyses at his blog Still Sudan. He can be reached at m.elgizouli@gmail.com
By Steve Paterno
April 17, 2012 — Early this year in a confrontation over oil dispute with the Republic of Sudan, the government of South Sudan decided to shut down its oil production, which accounts for about 98% of its revenue. As a result, many analysts and observers concluded that the unexpected drastic measures of the oil shutdown amounted into committing economic suicide by South Sudan. In justifying the move, South Sudan characterized the dire situation as a zero sum game, where the country could either continue to produce its oil, which will be stolen by Khartoum or completely shut down the production so that both sides get nothing out of it. In response, Sudan fears that South Sudan is out to harm the interest of the regime in Khartoum. That the behavior of South Sudanese is of a murder-suicide personality, where given the options between incentives that could help the two countries and the one that can harm both countries; South Sudan decided to opt for the later, just as to see Khartoum endure the suffering. According to Khartoum’s propaganda, the sentiments of the South Sudanese is driven by the agenda of some foreign political powers, which “do not want Sudan and China to profit from the resources” in the country.
Members of the Khartoum regime are ignoring the negative dominant role it has been playing in shaping the sentiments and driving the actions of the South Sudanese toward its relationship with the North as they are tending to cast the blames somewhere else. For over the years, the interactions between North and South Sudan have been bitter—a relationship which has been at best, characterized by master-slave domination. Even with its fully fledged independence, the regime in Khartoum still thinks it can bully South Sudan into fiddle role of submission by supporting instability and rebellion in South Sudan; bombing and invading the country at will; and refusing to negotiate in good faith on pending post referendum issues between Sudan and South Sudan.
To prove its violations of South Sudanese territorial integrity, neglect the dignity of its people, and downplay its economic values, when the oil was first discovered in the country, in late 1970s, the regime in Khartoum even ignored to acknowledge that the actual location of the oil discovery is in fact in the Southern Sudan, Upper Nile province. Instead of telling the truth upon the discovery of the oil in Southern Sudan, the Khartoum regime announced that the oil was discovered “450 miles south of Khartoum,” without any mention by name of the exact location of the discovery. Ever since, Khartoum is relentlessly pursuing efforts in trying to annex the oil reserves located in Southern Sudan to be within the territorial Northern Sudan. The war happens to provide a perfect pretext for Khartoum to employ cruel methods that involve scotch earth policy as a means to forcefully annex Southern Sudanese oilfields into North. The forceful occupation of Abyei area by the regime in Khartoum and the current military confrontation to occupy Paanthou, (also infamously known as Heglig), are just few examples of Khartoum’s regime cruel modus operandi.
However, the South Sudan insistence to stand its ground in Paanthou through all means possible and to reclaim other disputed areas that include Abyei even by military means will change Khartoum’s strategy of belligerence forever. The current military confrontation in the disputed borders already cast some things under clear light and provided strategic shift for South Sudan in restoring the territorial integrity and ensuring the stability of the newly emerged country.
First, South Sudan restoration of Paanthou into its territory starves Khartoum of about half of its oil production. Sudanese economy is already feeling the pinch as the country’s currency shows dramatic decline against the dollar, selling at a double rate than the normal. In the capital Khartoum, people are experiencing long queues in petrol stations to fill up. The prices of commodities are on the rise. No matter what the outcome will be as to who will eventually control Paanthou, its economic impact can never be ignored, especially in short term. Early report is already indicating that Paanthou is reduced into rubble by Sudanese bombardments. Oil installations cannot escape from such damages, hence, even if oil flow is to start soon, it will not run into its full capacity.
Second, for South Sudanese to have full control of Paanthou, it deals Khartoum strategic blow as the country loses its important military base, which it uses as a launching pad in destabilizing South Sudan. Over the years, Khartoum upgraded Paanthou into a military base that offers a gateway into South Sudan, where South Sudanese militias are stationed, trained and supplied with intention of infiltrating South Sudan.
Third, by establishing full control over Paanthou and its vicinity, South Sudanese armed forces can easily link up with its natural military allies in the North, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), which is fighting to oust the regime in Khartoum. Liberation of border region by the SFR can shield South Sudan from Khartoum’s invasion. Therefore, it is natural for South Sudan to lend their full support to the SRF in liberation of Sudan from the dictatorial regime in Khartoum.
Fourth, securing strategic border points by South Sudanese will ensure stability of the country as that will push far away the threats of invasion by Khartoum armed forces.
Fifth, perhaps only through military confrontation will Khartoum relent in agreeing for a negotiable process, but what will be the point of signing an agreement with Khartoum, which it will not honor anyways.
In conclusions, South Sudan is not committing suicide. After all, it has nothing to lose to begin with as a result of years of subjugation under successive Khartoum regimes. If any thing, the country is freeing itself. The newly emerged country is not also committing any aggression as it is only acting in self defense in protection of its territorial integrity, dignity of its people, and economic worth. So, Khartoum must start to view South Sudan as an independent state, which deserves full respect, and if military confrontation is the means to exact that from Khartoum, so be it.
Steve Paterno is the author of The Rev. Fr. Saturnino Lohure, A Romain Catholic Priest Turned Rebel. He can be reached at stevepaterno@yahoo.com
By John A. Akec
April 16, 2012 — No one can dispute that South Sudan is one of the few nations on this planet that has offered enormous sacrifices in order to arrive at where it now stands: a sovereign state that has achieved its freedom through blood of its martyrs that culminated in the exercise of the right to self-determination. This right is assured by many UN conventions. For example, Article 1 (1) of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights states: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
Self-determination, thus, comes loaded with huge responsibilities that are summed up by the innocent-looking but highly significant words of the last sentence of the clause: "By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
So often, as post-independence African history would attest to, it takes generations (and more struggle and further sacrifices) for the nations of post-liberation countries to fully realise this responsibility. That such responsibility is not being realised adequately can be manifested in many obvious cases as well as hidden and subtle ways.
As part of this attached responsibility, all national governments (ancient or nascent) are expected to safeguard their citizens’ interests, rights, and lives at all time; not just at home front but also wherever the citizens of the concerned nation are to be found in the global village.
SOUTH SUDNANESE IN SUDAN – DO THEY MATTER TO ANYONE? Having more than a half-million South Sudanese citizens living in the Republic of Sudan (for well known historical reasons, most of which has to do with taking refuge during the long North-South war), one would have thought all government organs in the Republic of South Sudan would do their very best to safeguard the rights and interests of these folk, especially at the time of transition and tensions with the successor state, Sudan.
More could have been done to reduce the hardships currently experienced by many caused by transition to independence. Instead, it would seem those who packed and made the exit and are fortunate to hold positions of responsibility in the new Republic, are determined not to look back again at those who lingered behind, whatever the causes and reasons.
CASE IN POINT – NO MONEY TRANSFER MECHANISMS BETWEEN SOUTH SUDAN AND SUDAN, UNTIL NOW A striking example is the absence of money transfer system between South Sudan and Sudan since South Sudan’s declaration of independence on 9th of July 2011. This was when the government of Sudan decided to stop money transfer from Sudan to South Sudan and vice versa, pending the setting up of international system for money transfer between the two countries. The Bank of South Sudan (BOSS), the South Sudan central bank, was caught by surprise; when its electronic banking system that was run on a server presumably housed and administered by Sudan’s central bank was disconnected, bringing down the electronic transaction system in BOSS for several weeks, before the Bank was able to offer the service again.
Today, nine months since declaration of the independence, South Sudan central bank is yet to set up an international money transfer system to and from Sudan, despite the negative impact the lack of such facility has had on large population of South Sudan nationals still stranded in Sudan.
SOME BASIC FACTS ABOUT COMPOSITION OF SOUTH SUDANESE IN SUDAN
This population is composed mainly of those retired from civil and organized forces in what was North Sudan who are still waiting to receive their retirement pay from Khartoum government; South Sudanese studying in Sudan universities; families split up with one of the couples working in South Sudan while the rest of family continues to live in Sudan to allow children to complete school or vice versa, that is, the wife and children resetling in the South while the husband stays behind to sell family home or complete other family business; medical students completing houseman ship in Sudanese hospitals; those who have headed to Sudan to Khartoum to seek medical treatment (because they could not afford going to Jordon, India, or Nairobi); self-employed people with vocational skills who are not yet sure if they will find work in their new country and who know how to survive in Sudan; and finally, the hundreds of thousands of poor IDPs who want to leave but have been stranded for months on end to have their turn to be transported by land or river. We are talking of between 500,000 to 700,000 of them, or about 7% of South Sudan population.
’SUDDEN’ SUSPPENSION OF FLIGHT BETWEEN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN – NOT AGAIN!
As if the above hardship was not enough, the episode was spectacularly repeated last week when the Civil Aviation Authority in the Republic of Sudan notified South Sudan Ministry of Transport on 6th April that it was suspending flights between the two neighbouring countries from 9th April 2012 until the two countries agree on a system of flights that follows international code, implying among other things, passengers should follow proper immigration procedures including issue of visas and possession of valid travel documents. Not again! The news hit South Sudan Ministry of Transport like a thunder bolt- totally unprepared. But no, it is a thunder bolt to be borne solely by many South Sudanese who are still flocking out of Sudan in their hundreds and thousands everyday, since 2010. And with the drawing close of 9th April 2012 and increasing tensions between two Sudans this announcement was the last straw that broke the back of the helpless South Sudanese still resident in the Republic of Sudan. With no means to receive money from homeland (even by errand as it used to be when there was air travel), most are not allowed to work, many still waiting for pension money, their awes are compounded and getting desperate by day.
Interestingly enough, Madame Agnes Poni Lukudu, the Minister of Transport in the Republic of South Sudan, explicitly placed the blame squarely at the door of Khartoum government "for any inconvenience caused as a result of unilateral decision by it to stop flights between South Sudan and Sudan." Nowhere in her statement which she delivered at South Sudan Hotel in Dr. John Garang’s Hall last Saturday (7th April 2012) and published by the Citizen newspaper, did the Minister acknowledge the failure of her Ministry in not being proactive enough to take measures well ahead, before the axe of Khartoum could fall on the heads of South Sudanese air travelers, as happened last year when the Bank of South Sudan was caught with no money-transfer arrangement in place at the time Khartoum decided to pull the plug on the nascent nation and had our central bank electronic account frozen. The Khartoum un-decoded message to us in Juba was then, and is now:"Systems for public goods don’t come out of vacuum, somebody somewhere consciously made effort to create them. Now create your own systems. Good riddance!"
Reacting to the circular, all that Madame Lukudu could afford to offer in these circumstances was to advise South Sudan air travelers heading South:"to find alternative routes;" and that "Khartoum will be responsible for any inconvenience caused by this unilateral decision."
Such a hands-off approach, I confess is not sufficient, and is hardly a reassuring for many South Sudanese who are currently stranded in Khartoum airport, most of whom lack travel documents, let alone having deep pockets enough to get them out of Sudan via other routes.
A week has passed and the Ministry has not made any visible efforts to resolve the problem with Sudan Civil Aviation Authority to allow air travel between two Sudans to resume while the international system is being setup, apart from announcing the bad news to the public.
Moreover, despite the later decision by Sudan Civil Aviation Authority(on the pressure by airline companies) to allow additional one-month grace period for airliners to put their houses in order while flights continue as normal (exceptfor showing an emergency travel form from South Sudan Embassy in Khartoum and vice versa in Juba), reliable sources from airliners say that the Ministry of Transport in South Sudan has paradoxically closed South Sudan airports in the face of commercial passenger planes travelling from Khartoum; ostensibly as an implementaion of the circular of Sudan Civil Aviation Authority! No further information has been released by the Ministry about the progress on negotiations with Sudan Civil Authority (if any). It would appear, therefore, that the Ministry of Transport is not treating flight suspension between Sudan and South Sudan with the urgency and seriousness it deserves.
CLOSING REMARKS Admittedly and thankfully, the Ministries of Interior and that of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of South Sudan have sent teams to prepare emergency travelling documents as well as passports for those who are travelling by land, river, and air. However, their efforts can be useful only if South Sudan Ministry of Transport allows the flight to resume sooner than later, pending any agreement about new arrangements with Sudan. That is, no need to tread the same path of Bank of South Sudan.
Failing that, there is no moral equivalence to be relied upon by the Ministry of Transport in being too rigid in implementing Sudan’s government circular to the last letter. But instead, there could be a strong case to be argued about the possible failure by the Ministry in the duty of care towards South Sudanese in the Republic of Sudan. Candid analysis will not fail to point out that, in this episode, the Ministry of Transport has been the weakest in link in the chain of events, leading to many South Sudanese air travelers being stranded in Khartoum Airport.
To close, it is worth reminding ourselves that all the Ministers in South Sudan make the following oath before assuming office:
"I [name], do hereby swear by the Almighty God /solemnly affirm/, that as a Minister, I shall be faithful and bear true faith and allegiance to South Sudan and shall diligently and honestly discharge my duties and responsibilities and strive to foster the development and welfare of its people; that I shall obey, preserve and defend the Constitution and abide by the law; and that I shall protect and promote the unity of the people of South Sudan and consolidate the democratic decentralized system of government and preserve the integrity and dignity of the people of South Sudan; so help me God/ God is my witness.” (Article 1 (2) of Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011).
Watching from the margin, and seeing how some of our ministers are willfully failing to honour and internalize their pledges made before assuming office; namely to preserve the dignity of the people of South Sudan (everywhere, with Sudan being a case in point); many of us are bound to shake our heads and rub our chins, thinking: "Joshua, you are being led down. Shake the team up to perform, and get a back-eye!"
God bless South Sudan.
*The author is vice chancellor of University of Northern Bahr El Ghazal, and chairperson of Academics and Researchers Forum for Development (ARFD,) an academics-led think-tank in South Sudan. For this and related articles, please check out the author’s blog, at: www.JohnAkecSouthSudan.blogspot.com.
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